On Dec. 15, 1978, U.S. President Jimmy Carter announced the break in relations with Taipei. But roughly 55 treaties, agreements and programs with Taiwan were to remain in effect and the president declared that “the people of our country will maintain our current commercial, cultural, trade and other relations with Taiwan through non-governmental means.”
This unusual arrangement required legitimization by the U.S. Congress. Rejecting the Carter administration’s legislative proposals as too timid, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, and it was subsequently signed into law by the president.
Some describe the TRA as a “tacit” alliance. According to Section 2 of the law, Washington will “consider any attempt to resolve the Taiwan issue by other than peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” In terms of arms sales, Section 3 clearly states that it is U.S. policy to provide Taiwan with such weapons as may be necessary for its security and an adequate defensive capability and that the quality and quantity of these weapons will be determined by the president and the Congress after consultation with U.S. military authorities. When commenting on the TRA, Carter observed that it provides a president with “the option of going to war and protecting Taiwan.”
In addition to security ties, the TRA provides for the continuation of robust “unofficial” diplomatic ties between the two societies. As the U.S. Department of State often observes, America’s “unofficial” relations with Taiwan are closer than America’s “official” relations with most other countries. Washington maintains an “unofficial” embassy in Taipei, while Taipei operates an “unofficial” embassy in the U.S. capital, 10 “unofficial” consulate offices in major U.S. cities and one “unofficial” representative office in the U.S. territory of Guam.
Over the course of the past 30 years, the TRA has stood the test of time. It has not tied the hands of decision-makers. For example, defense links have grown during the post-normalization period. American arms sales to Taiwan actually increased. Although Washington is not formally committed to Taipei’s defense, the law enabled President Bill Clinton to dispatch two aircraft carrier battle groups to patrol the waters around Taiwan when cross-strait tensions soared in 1996. Moreover, other forms of military cooperation have accelerated.
Political linkages have also expanded. Taiwan leaders are now permitted to make “transit stopovers” in the United States and Taipei upgraded the name of its U.S. representative offices. Furthermore, high-level officials from Taiwan are now permitted to visit the United States, while U.S. officials may travel to Taiwan. And Washington has complied with the provisions in Section 4, Paragraph 9 of the law, stating that the TRA cannot be construed as “a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan” from international organizations. The United States is one of the staunchest supporters of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in numerous global bodies—particularly the World Health Organization.
Normally, most of the credit for the crafting of the TRA goes to the U.S. Congress. After all, American lawmakers wrote the law and passed it. At the same time, President Carter received numerous accolades for signing the act into law. He could have vetoed the legislation. But many do not understand the role that Taipei played in this process.
Then ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo began to prepare for the break in diplomatic relations with the United States long before ties actually were severed. He ordered Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to outline contingency plans to help offset the ramifications of Washington’s recognition of Beijing. The president worked hard to convince U.S. officials that while Taipei opposed a break in relations, it deserved assurances that ties with America would continue essentially as in the past. Chiang resisted invitations to travel to America to confront the Carter administration. He did not want to see Taiwan become a “football” in American politics.
Due to farsighted leadership in Taipei and Washington, the TRA has yielded high dividends for both governments. In fact, the law has proved to be a “win-win-win” formula for Taipei, Washington and Beijing. It has allowed Beijing to maintain “face” as Washington’s relations with Taipei must remain technically “unofficial.” But as President Chiang observed some years after the passage of the TRA, the legislation has enabled U.S.-ROC relations to grow closer than ever.
—Dennis V. Hickey is the James F. Morris Professor of Political Science at Missouri State University.
These views are the author’s and not necessarily those of the TJ.
Copyright © 2009 by Dennis V. Hickey
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